The Legal Climate on Climate Change: The Fate of The EPA\u27s Clean Power Plan after Michigan and UARG by Katz, Israel
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 8
1-1-2017
The Legal Climate on Climate Change: The Fate of
The EPA's Clean Power Plan after Michigan and
UARG
Israel Katz
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Energy and Utilities
Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Legislation Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme
Court of the United States Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Israel Katz, The Legal Climate on Climate Change: The Fate of The EPA's Clean Power Plan after Michigan and UARG, 11 Brook. J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 495 (2017).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol11/iss2/8
THE LEGAL CLIMATE ON CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE FATE OF THE EPA’S CLEAN
POWER PLAN AFTERMICHIGAN AND UARG
ABSTRACT
One of the centerpieces of the United States’ effort to combat climate
change is the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) controversial Clean
Power Plan, which consists of the first-ever federal regulations requiring
states to achieve massive carbon dioxide emissions reductions from existing
fossil fuel-fired power plants. The regulations operate by setting interim and
final emissions target dates for states to ultimately reach an aggregate 32%
reduction in carbon emissions by the year 2030. This Note argues that the
current regulations will not survive judicial scrutiny, because the U.S.
Supreme Court has moved away from traditional administrative deference in
instances where an administrative agency seeks an enormous and
transformative expansion to its regulatory authority. Furthermore, several
studies predict that the impact to global greenhouse gas reduction from
unilateral U.S. action will be negligible. As a result, rather than
promulgating sweeping and inflexible rules for limiting carbon emissions,
the EPA’s central focus and barometer for the plan’s effectiveness should be
its ability to spur and then sustain international climate change efforts. This
Note thus suggests some pragmatic amendments to the Clean Power Plan to
ensure that, when implementing reduction plans, states and utilities have
sufficient flexibility to alleviate potential grid reliability complications,
negative economic ramifications, and legal challenges that plague the
current regulations.
INTRODUCTION
When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced the final
regulations for the Clean Power Plan (CPP or the Plan), the Plan was met
with wide disapproval from two-dozen U.S. states, fossil fuel groups, and the
coal industry.1 The regulations, proposed in June 2014 and finalized in
August 2015, are the first federal rules to limit carbon dioxide emissions from
existing power plants.2 They set individualized targets for states to cut
energy-sector carbon dioxide emissions before the year 2030, by 32% from
1. Editorial Board, President Obama’s Tough, Achievable Climate Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/opinion/president-obamas-tough-achievable-climate-
plan.html?_r=0; Chelsea Harvey, Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He
Might—And Might Not—Succeed,WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/11/trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-clean-power-plan-heres-
how-he-might-and-might-not-succeed/?utm_term=.f42fe3495c30.
2. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
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2005 levels.3 The EPA asserts the Plan rests on a sound legal and technical
foundation,4 while critics allege the Plan represents an illegal federal
overreach, which will drive up utility rates and undercut electric grid
reliability.5Almost immediately following the final promulgation of the Plan,
this controversy entered federal court.6
This Note focuses on the ongoing lawsuit and argues that the CPP
requires certain amendments to survive, and to achieve its intended
environmental impact, for two distinct reasons. First, although historically
the U.S. Supreme Court granted an administrative agency’s statutory
interpretation broad deference, the Court has moved away from the Chevron
v. NRDC7 line of cases and has taken a new approach in both UARG v. EPA8
and Michigan v. EPA.9 The latter cases indicate that the Supreme Court will
cut the EPA little slack; the Court will likely determine that the EPA has
unduly interfered with the energy sector and thereby overstepped the bounds
of reasonable regulation.
Second, the modest—or insignificant—projected effects the CPP will
have on global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reflect the limited potential
of unilateral U.S. action to impact the planet’s climate. Given that the Plan
requires states to reach ambitious targets within a short timeframe to reduce
carbon emissions, states and utility companies will most likely resort to
dramatic energy efficiencymandates, including premature retirement of coal-
fired power plants, in order to meet these goals. This in turn could lead to
serious repercussions in the form of staggering costs to utility customers and
significant risks to electric grid reliability. The result: one of the most
expensive EPA regulations ever—and one that does not even accomplish its
intended goal to reduce atmospheric GHGs and to counter global warming.10
The CPP regulations raise serious questions about the EPA’s legal
authority to act in this instance. Accordingly, for the CPP to sustain an
inevitable legal challenge before the Supreme Court the EPAmust scale back
3. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 2–3,
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf [hereinafter
CPP FACT SHEET].
4. See generally LEGALMEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR CERTAIN
ISSUES, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpp-legal-memo.pdf
[hereinafter CPP MEMORANDUM]; see Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,661; see also CPP FACT
SHEET, supra note 3, at 2.
5. Editorial Board, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., In reMurray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In reWest Virginia, et
al, No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 9, 2015).
7. See generally Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. See generally Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
9. See generallyMichigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
10. See, e.g., Paul C. Knappenberger & Patrick J. Michaels, 0.02°C Temperature Rise Averted:
The Vital Number Missing from the EPA’s ‘By the Numbers’ Fact Sheet, CATO AT LIBERTY, (June
11, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/002degc-temperature-rise-averted-vital-number-
missing-epas-numbers-fact-sheet.
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the enormous and transformative expansion the Plan confers on the EPA’s
regulatory authority. Furthermore, the EPA must amend the CPP to avoid the
risks of more expensive and less dependable energy, while at the same time
sending a strong message to the international community that the United
States is serious about its commitment to curb carbon emissions.
This Note offers three amendments to the CPP, which, taken together,
would permit states more flexibility to implement carbon emission reduction
plans. This, in turn, will mitigate potential grid reliability complications,
negative economic ramifications, and legal challenges that plague the current
regulations. First, the EPA should replace its interim target goals beginning
in 2022 with a more flexible approach that provides states with greater
leeway in determining the proper glide path to achieve the EPA’s final goals
by 2030. Second, the CPP should offer states the flexibility to extend the
2030 deadline if a clear path to meaningful reduction is evident in a
reasonable timeframe. Finally, the EPA should revise its compliance formula
to provide proper credit under the EPA’s rate-based method for retiring and
not replacing existing coal-fired power plants with other forms of fossil
generation.
Part I of this Note explains the general framework of the EPA’s Clean
Power Plan. Part II describes how the Supreme Court is moving away from
the traditional deference courts have granted to administrative agencies’
statutory interpretations, and how the cases inform judicial review of the
CPP. Part III details how, if implemented, the CPP will negatively impact the
economy in the form of higher energy costs, grid reliability complications,
and job losses. Finally, Part IV sets forth comprehensive measures that, if
adopted by the EPA, will allow the CPP to survive judicial review and enable
clean energy development to occur under a sensible, transparent, and flexible
regulatory environment.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
On August 3, 2015, the EPA announced the Clean Power Plan, which the
agency referred to as a “historic step” to reduce carbon emissions.11 The EPA
introduced the CPP as evidence mounted on carbon pollution’s contribution
to climate change.12 According to the National Research Council,13
11. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov
/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
12. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,509, 64,517
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
13. The National Research Council is a nonprofit and private institution “that provides expert
advice on some of the most pressing challenges facing the nation and the world.” According to the
National Research Council’s website, its mission is to improve government decision making and
public policy, increase public understanding, and promote the acquisition and dissemination of
knowledge in matters involving science, engineering, and health. See Who We Are, NAT’L RES.
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“emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels have ushered
in a new epoch where human activities will largely determine the evolution
of earth’s climate.”14 Already in 2009, based on a large body of robust and
compelling evidence, former EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson issued the
Endangerment Finding under Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act
(CAA).15 In the Endangerment Finding, the EPA determined that the current,
elevated concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere—already at levels
unprecedented in human history—may reasonably “endanger public health
and welfare” of current and future generations in the United States.16 The
EPA concluded carbon emissions directly contribute to climate change and
the effects of climate change have been felt already.17 According to the EPA,
climate change has caused extreme weather events, fromwildfires and severe
drought in the western United States to rising water levels throughout the
country.18 In fact, in 2014 the EPA noted that, “2014 was the hottest year
recorded in history, and 14 of the 15 warmest years on record have occurred
all in the first 15 years of this century.”19 In order to combat climate change,
the EPA focused its attention on existing coal-fired power plants, since they
are the largest source of carbon emissions in the United States—making up
38.3% of all energy related carbon dioxide emissions.20
As part of the Plan, the EPA imposed carbon dioxide emission limits on
each of the forty-eight states with fossil fuel power plants, to be implemented
by 2022;21 the Plan aims to reduce nationwide carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel power plants by 32% by 2030.22 These limits vary by state, and
account for each state’s ability to implement three distinct emission reduction
COUNCIL, http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/whoweare/index.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2017).
14. NAT’LRES. COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS,
AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 3 (2011) [hereinafter CLIMATE STABILIZATION
TARGETS].
15. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,517; see
also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a)
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98).
16. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497.
17. Id.; see also CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 2.
18. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497–98; see also CLIMATE STABILIZATION
TARGETS, supra note 14, at 3.
19. CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 2.
20. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,509, 64,522–
23 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
21. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
22. CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 2.
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measures, or “building blocks.”23 These building blocks, also designated by
number, include the following measures:
(1) reducing the carbon intensity of electricity generation by improving the
heat rate of existing coal-fired power plants; (2) substituting increased
electricity generation from lower-emitting existing natural gas plants for
reduced generation from higher-emitting coal-fired power plants; and (3)
substituting increased electricity generation from new zero-emitting
renewable energy sources (like wind and solar) for reduced generation from
existing coal-fired power plants.24
State plans were due to be submitted by September 2016.25 States that
required additional time had the ability to request an extension of up to two
years.26 The Plan also grants the EPA authority to impose the agency’s own
regime, in the form of default rules, on states that fail to comply.27
Before the EPA issued the final Plan, the nation’s largest coal company,
Murray Energy Corp., and fourteen coal-producing states filed suit,
challenging the EPA’s climate change rules.28 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the EPA,
finding it would be unprecedented for a court to review a rule that had been
introduced only in draft form.29 When the final regulations were issued in
August 2015, West Virginia and fifteen other states (the States) filed suit,
claiming, among other things, the EPA lacked legal authority to implement
the law under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.30 Rather than wait for the
23. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667.
24. CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 4.
25. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,855. This deadline has not been enforced since the U.S.
Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the Plan in February 2016. See State of West Virginia
et al., v. EPA, et al., 577 U.S. (2016) (unpublished table decision); Lyle Denniston, Carbon
Pollution Controls Put on Hold, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2016, 6:45 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/carbon-pollution-controls-put-on-hold/. The Court’s decision
also put state planning processes in limbo. Montana Governor, Steve Bullock, immediately put the
state’s compliance plans on hold. See Emily Holden, Elizabeth Harball & EllenM. Gilmer, SCOTUS
Halts Clean Power Plan, Stuns States Planning Carbon Cuts, E&E NEWS (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032137. Other states, including Arizona, Virginia, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina, have taken a more measured approach and are cautiously awaiting
the outcome, but at the same time, pushing to remain fully prepared should the court uphold the
regulations. Id.
26. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,855.
27. Id. at 64,855–56.
28. See generally In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
29. Id. at 336.
30. Brief for Petitioners for Extraordinary Writ at 4–8, In re West Virginia, et al., v. EPA, No.
15-1277 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Extraordinary Writ].
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Plan’s publication, the States sought an emergency stay of the rules’ already-
applicable deadlines under the All Writs Act.31
The States argued that because of the rigid deadlines demanded by the
regulations, absent an immediate stay they would be “irreparably harmed” by
the steps that must immediately be taken to begin reordering the way their
citizens receive and consume energy.32 Additionally, the States contended
that in order to meet the CPP targets, the States would have to assess the
“forms of energy available to the State, whether developing more new energy
sources is feasible, and what changes to state law would be required.”33 These
and other expenditures would “immediately redirect sovereign institutions
away from serving the people, causing further irreparable harm.”34 Finally,
the States argued that they were “clearly and indisputable entitled to relief,”
because the EPA did not have the authority to regulate carbon emissions from
coal-fired power plants under the CAA.35
On September 9, 2015, in a two-paragraph order, a three-judge panel for
the D.C. Circuit ruled that the petitioner States must await the agency’s
publication of the final regulations in the Federal Register before the States
may file suit and request a stay of the CPP.36 The Judges cryptically wrote,
“[p]etitioners have not satisfied the stringent standards that apply to petitions
for extraordinary writs that seek to stay agency action.”37
On October 23, 2015, the final regulations were published in the Federal
Register.38 Not surprisingly, the publication of the regulations was quickly
followed by a “flurry of litigation” from twenty-three states, again led by
West Virginia.39 Oklahoma and North Dakota additionally filed suits in
separate actions.40 On January 26, 2016, the State of West Virginia along
31. Id. at 9. The All Writs Act provides that “all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
32. Brief for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 30, at 2.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 16–21; see also infra Part II B.
36. In reWest Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2015).
37. Id.
38. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (setting
emission-limits for existing fossil-fuel fired electric generating units (GHGs)); Standards of
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,509 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98) (setting
carbon-emission limits for new, modified and reconstructed power plants).
39. See State Petitioners Motion for Stay and for Expedited Consideration of Petition for
Review, State of West Virginia, State of Texas et al v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015);
Joby Warrick, States Sue to Block EPA’s Pollution Rule — Even as Some Try to Comply, WASH.
POST (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/states-sue-to-
block-epas-pollution-rules—even-as-some-try-to-comply/2015/10/23/1002a1de-79c6-11e5-b9c1-
f03c48c96ac2_story.html.
40. Warrick, supra note 39.
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with twenty-five other states41 filed an application to stay the CPP with the
U.S. Supreme Court.42 Two weeks later, the Supreme Court granted the stay
halting the implementation of the CPP, pending the resolution of the legal
challenges in the D.C. Circuit.43
II. THE CPPWILL NOT SURVIVE A SUPREME COURT
CHALLENGE
A. BACKGROUND TO SECTION 111(D) OF THECLEANAIRACT
The EPA’s legal authority to set emission standards derives from Section
111(d) of the Clean Air Act.44 This statute, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7411,45
requires states to set performance standards, subject to EPA guidelines, for
existing sources of air pollutants not otherwise regulated as a “national
ambient air quality standard” pursuant to Section 740846 or emitted from a
source regulated under the hazardous air pollutant provisions of Section
7412.47 Section 7411(a) defines “standard of performance” in terms of the
level of pollution reduction achievable by the “best system of emission
reduction which . . . the Administrator . . . has adequately demonstrated.”48
Under the CPP, the EPA defines “best system” of reduction as more than
just improvements at individual electricity generating units.49 Since these
units are part of an integrated electrical grid,50 the EPA believes the best
system extends to what can be achieved across the network, through fuel
substitution, energy efficiency, and other measures that would reduce the
demand for coal-fired power.51 This results in three “building block”
measures that regulate existing power plant emissions and also attempt to
regulate “beyond the line” of the power plant.52 In other words, in addition to
41. These states are: Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See Application for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action at 49–54, State of West Virginia, State
of Texas, et al v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016).
42. See generally id.
43. State of West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. (2016) (unpublished table decision); Denniston,
supra note 25.
44. See CPP MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, at 1–4; Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663–64
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012).
46. Id. § 7408.
47. Id. §§ 7411(d)(1), 7412.
48. Id. § 7411(a).
49. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,664–67.
50. Id. at 64,665.
51. Id. at 64,667; see also CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 3–6.
52. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667.
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these regulations setting emission limits based on the actual source of the
emissions, the regulations also require alternate scenarios to reduce GHG
emissions that have nothing to do with the power plant itself.53 These
measures include renewable energy generation and demand-side energy
efficiency.54
B. QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY
The twenty-six states (the Complainant States) that have filed lawsuits,
as well as leading industry and constitutional experts, have raised several
important arguments that should be considered when a reviewing court
analyzes the CPP.55 Emissions from existing coal-fired power plants are
already regulated under Section 112 of the CAA,56 meaning under the CPP
these power plants would be subject to double regulation. The Complainant
States and others argued that, pursuant to the explicit language of CAA
section 111(d), the EPA may not regulate “any air pollutant” emitted from a
“source category . . . regulated under [Section 112].”57 Since power plants
are a “source category” that has already been regulated by the EPA for their
mercury pollution under Section 112,58 the EPA cannot use Section 111(d) to
reach another air pollutant emitted from that same source category. The EPA
adopts a different interpretation of the phrase “regulated under” from the
Complainant States and concludes that the Section 112 exclusion only
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generallyBrief for ExtraordinaryWrit, supra note 30. Several important arguments were
also raised by Professor Lawrence Tribe, U.S. constitutional Scholar, and counsel for Peabody
Energy Corp., “the world’s largest private sector coal company.” Erica Martinson, Lawrence Tribe,
Obama’s Legal Mentor, Attacks EPA Power Plant Rule, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2015, 5:14 PM), http
://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/epa-power-plant-rule-laurence-tribe-116258; EPA’s Proposed
111(d) Rule for Existing Power Plants: Legal and Cost Issues, Testimony before H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Energy & Power (2015) (testimony of Lawrence Tribe,
Professor, Harv. Univ. & Harv. Law Sch.), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20150317/
103073/HHRG-114-IF03-Wstate-TribeL-20150317-U1.pdf [hereinafter EPA Proposed 111(d)
Rule].
56. On December 20, 2000, the EPA promulgated regulations, which limit certain mercury
emissions from existing coal-fired power plants. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET:
CONSIDERATION OF COST IN THE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY FINDINGS FOR THE MERCURY
ANDAIR TOXICS STANDARDS FOR POWER PLANTS 2 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production
/files/2016-05/documents/20160414_mats_ff_fr_fs.pdf [hereinafter MATS FACT SHEET]. These
regulations were issued pursuant to section 112(n)(1)(a) of the CAA. Id. On February 16, 2012, the
final MATS rules were published in the Federal Register. See generally National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg.
9304 (proposed Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012); Brief for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 30, at 16–17; see
also EPA Proposed 111(d) Rule, supra note 55, at 33–36.
58. See MATS FACT SHEET, supra note 56, at 2–3; see also National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 9307.
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“excludes the regulation of hazardous air pollutants” (HAP).59 Since the EPA
does not list carbon dioxide as a type of HAP,60 the EPA claimed that the
Section 112 exclusion did not apply.61
Even if carbon dioxide could be characterized as a type of HAP, the EPA
still averred it had regulatory authority under Section 111(d), since the
section is ambiguous.62 If a statute is ambiguous, the courts generally give
deference to the administrative agency implementing the regulations, so long
as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.63 The EPA’s current
interpretation of Section 111(d) claims there are essentially two versions of
Section 111(d), which leaves the provision open to interpretation and
therefore ambiguous.64 This stems from conflicting amendments made to
Section 111(d) during the 1990 CAA Amendments.65 The Senate version of
the bill provided that “pollutants” previously regulated under Section 112,
could no longer be regulated under Section 111(d).66 The House of
Representative (HOR) version, however, can be read to exclude “sources”
rather than just their pollutants.67 In other words, under the HOR version,
once a source (in this case a power plant) has been regulated under Section
112, it can no longer be regulated under Section 111(d).68 Conversely, under
the Senate version—which the EPA adopts69—the EPA is free to regulate
carbon emissions, which to date have not been regulated.
The Complainant States, however, adopted the HOR version of the
statute and therefore concluded that carbon emissions cannot be regulated
under Section 111(d), since power plant emissions of mercury and other
59. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,710 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
(emphasis added); see also EPA’s Response in Opposition, at 32–35, In re West Virginia v. EPA,
No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2015).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(11)(b) (carbon dioxide not included in the list); Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 64,710.
61. EPA’s Response in Opposition, supra note 59, at 32–35.
62. Id. at 32–33.
63. See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. EPA’s Response in Opposition, supra note 59, at 32–35.
65. Id. at 33. Compare the Senate amendment to the version of the bill contained in the
“conforming amendments” section of Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990),
with the HOR version, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990) (adding “emitted
from a source category which is regulated under section 112”). See Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 (Clean Air Act), Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012)) (emphasis added). The HOR version is essentially the
language that now appears in the U.S. Code. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
66. See Clean Air Act, § 302(a).
67. See id. § 108(g); Brief for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 30, at 18; see also EPA Proposed
111(d) Rule, supra note 55, at 40–42.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
69. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,714 n.294 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
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hazardous pollutants are already regulated under Section 112.70 The
Complainant States, in their pleadings, characterized the Senate version as a
simple “drafting error,” the type that occurs frequently in “modern, complex
legislation.”71 The Senate version, they argued, was purely a conforming
amendment that was intended to update a cross-reference in Section 111(d).72
The States therefore concluded that the EPA should ignore the error in the
cross reference, and it should be “given no substantive meaning.”73
C. SUPREMECOURT PRECEDENT
A court scrutinizing the CPP must review the regulations in light of
Supreme Court precedent and determine whether the EPA even has the
authority to author such expansive—and in practice, ineffective—
regulations. Although there is great controversy surrounding the potential
effects the CPP will have on global warming and the economy, the recent
trend in the Supreme Court—to limit deference to administrative agencies’
statutory interpretations—requires the EPA to make appropriate revisions to
the CPP in order to survive a judicial challenge. This trend is apparent in two
recent Supreme Court cases, Michigan v. EPA and Utility Air Regulatory
Group (UARG) v. EPA.74 Both cases involved an enormous and
transformative expansion of regulatory authority by the environmental
agency.
Prior to Michigan and UARG, the Supreme Court’s decisions dealing
with agencies’ interpretations of statutory questions were analyzed under the
two-step framework adopted in Chevron.75 Under Chevron, a court first
applies the traditional rules of statutory interpretation to determine whether
Congress has spoken directly on the question.76 If the statute is ambiguous,
the court will generally defer to the agency’s interpretation, so long as it is
reasonable.77
InMichigan, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, held that the EPA had
improperly excluded cost from its determination that regulation of power
plant emissions of mercury and other toxics was “appropriate and necessary”
70. Brief for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 30, at 18.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id. The AG brief also makes textual and constitutional arguments as to why building blocks
2 (shifting reliance on coal-fired power plants to natural gas) and 3 (shifting reliance on coal-fired
power to low or zero carbon energy generation like wind and solar) are illegal. Namely, that the
Plan violates the Tenth Amendment because it tramples on the states’ authority over interstate
generation and consumption of electricity “which is one of the most important functions
traditionally associated with police powers of the state.” Id. at 27; see also EPA Proposed 111(d)
Rule, supra note 55, at 16–23.
74. See generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
75. See generally Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
76. See id. at 842–43.
77. Id.; see also Michigan,135 S. Ct. at 2707.
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under Section 112 of the CAA.78 In UARG, the Court largely upheld the
EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from stationary sources under the CAA’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program.79 However, the
Court held that GHG emissions alone could not trigger the permitting
requirements of the program.80
D. BACKGROUND TOMATSREGULATION ANDMICHIGAN V. EPA
The 1990 CAA Amendments required the EPA to regulate electric utility
steam generating units (EGUs), if it found that such regulation was
“appropriate and necessary” after conducting a utility study.81 In 2012, the
EPA confirmed that EGU regulation was necessary and promulgated
emission standards.82 The emission standards set limits on mercury, arsenic,
nickel, dioxins and furans, and acid gasses emitted by coal-fired power
plants, known collectively as “mercury and air toxics” (MATS).83 The State
of Michigan, twenty-two other states, and a group of non-profit organizations
challenged the regulations before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.84
The D.C. Circuit upheld the MATS regulations and the plaintiffs appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.85
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded it was unreasonable
for the EPA to refuse to consider costs when making its determination that
regulation was appropriate and necessary.86 Citing precedent, the Court
explained that, to be lawful, an agency regulation must be based on an
agency’s consideration of the relevant factors, and the majority recognized
that agencies frequently consider costs when determining whether regulation
is appropriate.87 The Court explained that the applicable “appropriate and
necessary” standard at issue in the case necessarily encompassed a
consideration of costs by the EPA.88 While the Court questioned whether the
rule was cost effective based on the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis, it made clear
that the EPA’s error was its refusal to consider costs at the initial “appropriate
and necessary” determination stage.89 The majority clearly emphasized that
78. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–08.
79. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
80. Id. at 2446.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
82. MATS FACT SHEET, supra note 56, at 2.
83. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility,
Industrial-Commercial- Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9306 (proposed Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 60, 63).
84. See generallyWhite Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
85. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015).
86. Id. at 2712.
87. Id. at 2707.
88. Id. at 2707–08.
89. Id. at 2708–10.
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typicalChevron deference did not apply in this case, stating: “Chevron allows
agencies to choose among competing reasonable interpretations of a statute;
it does not license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency keeps
parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.”90
Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, agreed with the majority that it
would be unreasonable for the EPA to ignore costs entirely in the Section 112
rulemaking process.91 However, the dissent concluded that the EPA’s
decision to exclude costs when making its “appropriate and necessary”
determination was reasonable, because the EPA intended to and had
considered costs at each of the subsequent steps in the rulemaking process.92
The dissent emphasized the deference owed to the EPAwhen interpreting the
requirements of the Clean Air Act and concluded that the EPA’s
interpretation of how to incorporate costs was reasonable.93
Despite Chevron’s deferential attitude towards an administrative
agency’s statutory interpretation, the Court in Michigan struck down the
EPA’s interpretation of “appropriate and necessary” and held that the EPA
was required to evaluate costs as part of its rulemaking process.94 This
indicates that in certain contexts, the Supreme Court is now willing to
scrutinize agency regulations when the agency’s authority to regulate stems
from an ambiguous statute. This limited deference might prove to be the
CPP’s undoing.
E. MICHIGAN V. EPA’S IMPACT ON THECPP
Former EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy dismissed Michigan as a
narrow holding and argued that the case, limited to its facts, bore no relevance
to the legality of the CPP.95 At first glance, it would seem that her assertions
are correct. The CPP would seem to have no similarity to the MATS
regulations for power plants at issue in Michigan. The two are based on
different provisions of the CAA. MATS was issued under Section 112, which
establishes a technology-based framework for reducing emissions of
hazardous air pollutants,96 whereas the CPP derives from Section 111(d),
which authorizes “standards of performance” for existing sources of
pollutants not regulated under Section 112.97 More importantly, the two
provisions differ in their approach to costs. Section 111(d) identifies cost as
a relevant factor in setting standards of performance and the EPA has
90. Id. at 2708.
91. Id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2718–19 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2726 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2712.
95. Timothy Cama, Supreme Court Defeat Won’t Hinder Climate Push, Says EPA Chief, THE
HILL (July 7, 2015, 12:08 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/247049-epa-head-
confident-after-supreme-court-loss.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
97. Id. § 7411(d).
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analyzed and explicitly considered cost as a relevant factor in its CPP
rulemaking.98 By contrast, Section 112(n)(1)(A) does not mention cost
explicitly99 and the EPA made a conscious choice (albeit to its detriment) not
to consider cost in its threshold decision to regulate power plants.100
However, Michigan’s significance as precedent for the CPP’s eventual
fate does not turn solely on the specific language of the statutory provisions
the EPA utilized. Rather, its significance is the unusually aggressive
approach of the majority in scrutinizing and then rejecting the EPA’s legal
and policy choices.101 Congress left the interpretation of “necessary and
appropriate” in the CAA open to the EPA’s discretion.102 The EPA then
determined that regulation of power plants for their MATS emissions was
“appropriate,” because power plant emissions presented “risks to human
health and the environment” and control options existed “to reduce these
emissions.”103 It determined that regulation was “necessary,” because other
CAA requirements applicable to power plants “[will] not eliminate these
risks.”104
The EPA also reasoned that a meaningful analysis of costs was
impossible before a proposed rule had been developed, but that costs would
be considered later in the rulemaking process.105 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that the EPA had strayed “far beyond [its] bounds.”106 In the
Court’s view, the term “appropriate” encompassed cost considerations and it
was unreasonable for the EPA to give these costs no weight in the original
decision to regulate power plants.107
A reviewing court will likely view the CPP in a similar fashion. Like
Section 112(n)(1)(A), Section 111(d) contains ambiguous language
susceptible to differing interpretations. One example of such language is the
phrase, “best system of emission reduction,”108 which the EPA has defined
to include more than regulation of an actual power plant, but also energy
98. Id.
99. Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
100. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2709–10 (2015).
101. Id. at 2708 (noting that “Chevron allows agencies to choose among competing reasonable
interpretations of a statute; it does not license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency
keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not”).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
103. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial- Institutional, and Small
Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9363 (proposed
Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63)).
104. Id.
105. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9326–27.
106. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
107. Id. at 2707–08.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (2012).
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efficiency mandates and increased reliance on renewables.109 Another
example is the conflicting amendments to the statute and the EPA’s choice
to adopt the version that allows double regulation of existing power plants.110
Despite the strong case for administrative agency deference, the court will
closely analyze whether the regulation in fact sets forth the “best system of
emission standards,” and whether Congress intended this expansion to the
EPA’s authority by adopting the Senate version of the bill. A court may very
well conclude that the EPA is interfering with the entire energy sector and
acting beyond the bounds of its regulatory authority.
F. UARG V. EPA AND THE EPA’S “TAILPIPERULE”
The UARG case was initiated after the EPA published, in the Federal
Register, an endangerment finding for GHGs on December 15, 2009.111
Accordingly, the EPA determined that GHGs, defined as an aggregate group
of six key gases, “may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public
health and to endanger public welfare.”112 Based on that finding, the EPA
then issued a rule promulgating emissions standards for motor vehicles,
known as the “Tailpipe Rule.”113
In the EPA’s view, the Tailpipe Rule set off a chain reaction under the
CAA.114 Under the CAA’s PSD Program, major stationary sources in certain
areas that emit, or have the potential to emit, 250 tons per year or more of
any air pollutant (or 100 tons per year for certain other sources) are required
to obtain preconstruction permits (PSD Program).115 Essentially, the PSD
Program “makes it unlawful to construct or modify a ‘major emitting facility’
in any area which [the PSD program] applies.”116 Sources subject to the PSD
Program are also required to install the best available control technology
(BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter.”117
Under Title V of the CAA, meanwhile, major stationary sources in certain
areas that emit, or have the potential to emit, 100 tons per year or more of
109. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
110. See EPA’s Response in Opposition, supra note 59, at 32–35.
111. See generally Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gasses
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 98).
112. Id. at 66,497.
113. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 (2014); Light Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg.
25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600).
114. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2437; see generally Reconsideration of Interpretation
of Regulation That Determines Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed.
Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71).
115. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(1) (2012).
116. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2431.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
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any air pollutant are required to obtain operating permits.118 In addition, there
are inspecting, monitoring, and reporting requirements (Title V
Requirements).119
The EPA has interpreted these provisions to mean that, once a pollutant
becomes regulated under the CAA, any major source that emits, or has the
potential to emit, over 100 or 250 tons per year of such pollutant is subject to
the PSD Program and Title V Requirements (PSD Trigger).120 Thus, the
newly minted motor vehicle regulations fell squarely within these
requirements, subjecting these vehicles to the onerous PSD Program and
Title V Requirements. After numerous parties, including several states,
challenged the regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court limited its decision to one
question: “whether the EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of
GHG emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements
under the CAA for stationary sources that emit GHGs.”121 In another 5-4
ruling, the Supreme Court answered that question in the negative.122 In an
opinion once again authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the notion
that the EPA’s interpretation of the PSDTrigger was statutorily compelled.123
The Court further held that the EPA’s interpretation of the PSD Trigger was
not permissible, because this interpretation would “place plainly excessive
demands on limited governmental resources” and would “bring about an
enormous and transformative expansion in the EPA’s regulatory authority
without clear congressional authorization.”124 The Court also noted that it
should respond skeptically when “an agency claims to discover in a long-
extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the
American economy.”125 Additionally, the Court emphasized that “[they]
expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions
of vast economic and political significance.”126 This decision is another
example of the Court refusing to defer to the EPA in interpreting the CAA,
when in the Court’s view the interpretation brings about an enormous
expansion to the EPA’s authority.
Ann Carlson and Megan Herzog127 argue that, similar to the GHG
emissions in UARG, the Supreme Court will likely view the broad scope and
effect of the EPA’s CPP, implementing a rarely utilized text of Section
118. See id. §§ 7602(j), 7661a(a).
119. Id. § 7661c(a)–(c).
120. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2436.
121. Id. at 2438.
122. Id. at 2442.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2444.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id.
127. Ann E. Carlson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law and Co-Faculty
Director of the Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at UCLA School of Law.
MeganM. Herzog is the Emmett/Frankel Fellow in Environmental Law and Policy at UCLA School
of Law.
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111(d),128 as overly expansive, without clear congressional direction.129 Thus,
instead of affording traditional agency deference, the Court will scrutinize
the statutory source of the EPA’s authority. First, “the Court would reject the
CPPs focus on an integrated system of electricity generation, transmission,
and delivery rather than individual plants.”130Instead, the Court could find
“that the language of [S]ection 111(d) reflects congressional intent to check
sources’ emission intensity via modest, state-driven technology requirements
imposed directly on power plants.”131In addition, “[c]onsidering reductions
achievable through measures that displace generation from regulated plants
would be viewed as a dramatic expansion of EPA authority well beyond the
scope of what the CAA envisions.”132
Carlson & Herzog continue: “[f]urthermore, notwithstanding that
[S]ection 111(d) grants the EPA broad authority, UARG noted that courts
respond skeptically where ‘an agency claims to discover in a long-extant
statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American
economy.’”133 The EPA used Section 111(d) only thirteen times previously
in the form of “traditional emission limits,” rather than by providing alternate
energy generation measures.134Also, theUARG Court was clear that the EPA
could not claim authority over previously unregulated small sources such as
motor vehicles, reasoning that courts are prohibited from extending deference
to agency decisions of vast “economic and political significance.”135 The
Court could invoke similar reasoning when reviewing the CPP.
These two cases demonstrate that in certain instances the Supreme Court
will refuse to defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation, particularly when
the regulation at issue involves vast economic restructuring. Thus, the CPP
will likely be viewed as a remarkably expansive power grab by the federal
government. As Professor Lawrence Tribe of Harvard Law School described
the regulations:
EPA possesses only the authority granted to it by Congress. It lacks
“implied” or “inherent” powers. Its gambit here raises serious questions
under the separation of powers, Article I, and Article III, because EPA is
attempting to exercise lawmaking power that belongs to Congress and
judicial power that belongs to the federal courts. The absence of EPA legal
128. See Application for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action at 2, State of West Virginia,
State of Texas v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016).
129. Anne E. Carlson & Megan M. Herzog, Text in Context: The Fate of Emergent Climate
Regulation After UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 30–31 (2015); see also
Jody Freedman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2015).
130. Carlson & Herzog, supra note 129, at 30.
131. Id.; see also Freedman, supra note 129, at 15–16.
132. Carlson & Herzog, supra note 129, at 30.
133. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); Carlson & Herzog, supra
note 129, at 31; see also Application for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action at 15–18, State of
West Virginia, State of Texas v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016).
134. Carlson & Herzog, supra note 129, at 29.
135. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
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authority in this case makes the Clean Power Plan, quite literally, a “power
grab.”136
Accordingly, for the CPP to sustain an inevitable legal challenge before
the Supreme Court, the EPA will have to scale back on the enormous and
transformative expansion the Plan provides to the agency’s regulatory
authority.
IV. ECONOMIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE CPP
A. EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY
Restricting the production of carbon-emitting conventional fuels with
heavy-handed regulations, such as the CPP, may significantly harm the U.S.
economy.137Americans feel the pain of higher energy prices directly, but also
indirectly through almost all of the goods and services they purchase, because
energy is a necessary component of virtually all production and service.138
As prices rise, companies will relocate to new countries where the cost of
doing business is lower. This results in lost jobs, lower incomes, and fewer
opportunities for workers.
Although the EPA estimates that the CPP will generate 52,000 to 83,000
jobs by the year 2030, by way of demand-side energy efficiency programs,139
a report by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA)
estimates 882,000 to 2.2 million jobs lost due to the new regulations.140 The
NRECA report also predicts a potential 10% to 25% increase in electricity
costs.141 Other projections also suggest that the cost of electricity may
increase significantly. The economic consulting firm National Economic
Research Associates (NERA) projects that whether or not a plan is state-
administered or EPA-administered, electricity prices will increase
considerably.142 If states administer their own plans, electricity prices will
136. EPA Proposed 111(d) Rule, supra note 55, at ii.
137. See, e.g., WAYNE WINEGARDEN, PH.D. & ALEXANDER SPECHT, THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN’S ECONOMIC IMPACT 7 (2016), https://www.pacificresearch.org/fileadmin/images/Studies_2
016/CleanPowerPlan_RegressivityReduction_Web.pdf; see also Sarah K. Magruder Lyle &
Alfredo Ortiz, Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hurts the Economy, THE HILL (Aug. 18, 2015, 9:00
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/251302-obamas-clean-power-
plan-hurts-economy.
138. See Magruder Lyle & Ortiz, supra note 137.
139. EVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
FINAL RULE ES 25 (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-
final-rule-ria.pdf.
140. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, AFFORDABLE ELECTRICITY: RURAL AMERICA’S
ECONOMIC LIFELINE 7 (2015), http://www.nreca.coop/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Affordable-
Electricity-Rural-Americas-Economic-Lifeline.pdf.
141. Id.
142. See NAT’L RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASS’N, POTENTIAL ENERGY IMPACTS OF THE
EPA PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN S 6–7 (2014), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/
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increase by a projected average of 12% between 2017 and 2031, but if the
administration is left to the EPA, prices project to increase an average of 17%
during that time period.143 Thus, if the NRECA prediction is correct, the job
losses far outweigh any of the job increases that the EPA expects the CPP
will generate.
The plethora of health benefits the EPA associates with the CPP is based
on a flawed assumption. According to the EPA, the health benefits will
amount to $14 billion to $34 billion by the year 2030.144 Experts explain that
there are two main ways the CPP can improve health: (1) by reducing the
effects of climate change, thereby decreasing deadly extreme weather events
like hurricanes and heat waves; and (2) by improving everyday air quality to
reduce premature deaths, asthma attacks, and heart disease.145 The EPA took
both the effects of climate change and air quality into account when it
determined the health benefits the CPP would generate.146 Although the CPP
regulations will likely improve the quality of the air we breathe, especially in
coal-heavy states,147 it is unlikely to reduce the effects of climate change on
a global scale, thereby increasing the health benefits associated with the
reduction of extreme weather patterns.148 According to the Model for the
Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change, which the EPA
assisted in developing, the climate regulations will reduce an estimated mere
0.018 degree Celsius of warming by 2100.149 Thus, the long-term health
benefits are in fact much lower than what the EPA is estimating them to be.
While the precise number is difficult to assess, in all likelihood it is far less
than the $14 billion to $34 billion that the EPA estimates, and perhaps it is
even less than the $8.4 billion annually it will cost to implement the CPP by
2030.150
publications/2014/NERA_ACCCE_CPP_Final_10.17.2014.pdf [hereinafter POTENTIAL ENERGY
IMPACTS].
143. Id.
144. CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 3.
145. Dallas Burtraw, Significant, Widespread Health Benefits Possible Under EPA’s Clean
Power Plan, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (May 4, 2015), http://common-resources.org/blog/2015/
significant-widespread-health-benefits-possible-under-epa-s-clean-power-plan (Dallas Burtraw is a
Darius Gaskins senior fellow and a co-author of “US Power Plant Carbon Standards and Clean Air
and Health Co-benefits” published in the May issue of Nature Climate Change.).
146. CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 2–3.
147. See, e.g., Burtraw, supra note 145.
148. See Knappenberger & Michaels, supra note 10.
149. Id.
150. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: BY THE NUMBERS CUTTING CARBON POLLUTANTS
FROM POWER PLANTS 2 (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-
cpp-by-the-numbers.pdf.
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B. GRIDRELIABILITY
One of the primary concerns among many electricity-grid operators
across the country is the CPP’s effect on grid reliability.151 The concerns stem
from the uncertain reliability of renewable energy sources, and that power
plants will be forced to close earlier than otherwise planned.152 For instance,
solar power only works during the day; wind turbines only generate
electricity when the wind is blowing. Indeed, the Southwest Power Pool
(SPP) warned that “unless the proposed CPP is modified, the SPP region
faces serious, detrimental impacts on reliable operation of the bulk electric
system—introducing the very real possibility of rolling blackouts or
cascading outages that will have significant impacts on human health, public
safety, and economic activity.”153
C. GOOD ECONOMIC POLICY
Sound economic policy dictates that the EPA amend its regulations to
mitigate the potential economic harm. The Cato Institute’s Paul
Knappenberger and Patrick Michaels estimate that a miniscule amount of
warming would be averted by the EPA’s CPP—about 0.018°C by 2100—
using a publicly available model developed by academic researchers with
support from the EPA and other organizations.154 Indeed, the CATO Institute
concludes that even reducing U.S. carbon emissions by 80% would have an
insignificant effect on global climate change.155
The modest and even insignificant size of those projected effects reflects
huge inertia present in the planet’s climate and, more importantly, the limited
effect of unilateral U.S. action.156 Therefore, actions by other countries,
especially China and India, are essential in efforts to reduce global
warming.157 Given that the estimated reduction levels are miniscule
compared to the overall global GHG reductions required to make a
151. See e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP, POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF EPA’S
PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN 17–20 (2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20
Assessments%20DL/Potential_Reliability_Impacts_of_EPA_Proposed_CPP_Final.pdf
[hereinafter RELIABILITY IMPACTS]; see also SW. POWER POOL, SPP CLEAN POWER PLAN
COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT (2015), http://www.spp.org/publications/SPP%20Regional%20Comp
liance%20Assessment%20Report.pdf.
152. See RELIABILITY IMPACTS, supra note 151, at 17–20.
153. See Dave Levitan,Will Power Plant Rules Cause Blackouts?, FACTCHECK (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.factcheck.org/2015/02/will-power-plant-rules-cause-blackouts/.
154. Knappenberger & Michaels, supra note 10.
155. See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SCI., CATO INST., ADDENDUM: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2012), https://www.cato.org/pubs/Global-Climate-Change-
Impacts.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40
C.F.R pt. 98).
514 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
meaningful impact on climate change, the purpose of any sweeping federal
regulation should be distilled to motivate international climate change efforts.
Recently, the United States has made great strides in the effort to curb
international carbon emissions by heading the negotiation and eventual
ratification of an international agreement among 197 nations to combat
climate change.158 While these efforts should certainly be applauded, what is
now needed is a continued and sustained effort from all of the nations
involved. Thus, now more than ever, the United States should refrain from
gambling with the very real threat of job losses and unreliable, higher-cost
energy.159 Rather, a more measured approach is appropriate so long as the
regulations the United States ultimately implements are sufficiently vigorous
to motivate a sustained international effort. Therefore, the economic “safe
bet” requires less over-reaching regulations. Moreover, if the EPA does
sustain a loss at the Supreme Court, the credibility of the United States would
sustain a serious and perhaps fatal blow, because we would fail to deliver on
our commitment.160
As a result of the EPA’s overreaching regulations, the chances of a real
globalized effort to curb GHG emissions may be lost or significantly delayed.
The EPA should craft a regulatory scheme bearing the following in mind: (1)
the regulatory scheme cannot be an enormous transformative expansion of
authority in order to pass judicial scrutiny; and (2) the regulations must be
sufficiently vigorous to effectively spur international climate change efforts,
without the potentially devastating economic ramifications.
158. See Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris
Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 3, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-agreement;
The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php (last
visited Feb. 13, 2017).
159. POTENTIAL ENERGY IMPACTS, supra note 142, at S-5.
160. This is especially the case now after the Paris Agreement, a global response to the threat of
climate change, that was ratified by the United States and 126 other nations. See The Paris
Agreement, supra note 158. Some of the key aspects of the agreement are: (1) long-term temperature
goals to limit the increase in temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius; (2) establishing binding
commitments by all parties “to prepare, communicate, and maintain a nationally determined
contribution, and to pursue domestic measures to achieve them;” and (3) to help and support
underdeveloped countries “to build clean, climate resilient features.” Summary of the Paris
Agreement, UNITEDNATIONS, http://bigpicture.unfccc.int/#content-the-paris-agreemen (last visited
Jan. 31, 2017). The CPP are the regulations intended to be utilized to fulfill the United States’
obligations to curb carbon emissions under the Paris Agreement. See Coral Davenport, Donald
Trump Can Put Climate Change on Course for ‘Danger Zone,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/donald-trump-climate-change.html?_r=0.
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V. SOME SENSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO THE CPP
A. FLEXIBILITY—AKEYCOMPONENT FOR THECPP TO PASS
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
A key component necessary for the Supreme Court to view the CPP
favorably is whether the regulations contain efforts to allow states more
flexibility when implementing plans to curb carbon emissions. If the EPA
demonstrates sufficient flexibility, it would be difficult for a court to strike
down the regulations, because the regulations would no longer be a “dramatic
expansion of authority.”161 The Court could acknowledge that the EPA’s
chosen program for “best system of emission standards”162 sensibly takes into
account cost effectiveness and gives the states proper leeway to accomplish
the reduction limits. Additionally, it would be easier for a court to see the
electric grid as an interconnected and integrated system when the EPA is
working together with, rather than against, the states, by way of more flexible
proposals to reach emission reduction targets.
Any rational solution must endeavor to serve two primary objectives.
First, the regulations must accomplish substantial GHG reduction, to spur
and then sustain international carbon emission reductions. Second, these
reduction measures must ensure states enough flexibility to implement a
carbon emissions reduction scheme without sparking the severe
repercussions in the form of higher energy costs and grid reliability risks.
Regulations that allow more flexibility will not only help alleviate most of
the grid reliability concerns, but, as an added benefit, will be more likely to
pass judicial scrutiny. To that end, the EPA should make the following
common-sense amendments to the CPP regulations.
B. REPLACE 2022 INTERIM TARGETS
As part of the CPP regulations, the EPA has not only established final
carbon emission performance rates that states are required to reach by 2030,
but has also set up interim rates that the states must meet by 2022.163 The
interim and final statewide goals come in three distinct forms:
[(1) a] rate-based state goal measured in pounds per megawatt hour
(lb/MWh); [(2) a] mass-based state goal measured in total short tons of
carbon dioxide; and [(3) a] mass-based goal with new source complement
measured in short tons of carbon dioxide.164
States must then develop and implement customized plans that achieve
the interim carbon emission performance rates by 2022 and the final carbon
161. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (2012).
163. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
164. CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3 at 3–4.
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emission rates by 2030.165 The State of Missouri, for example, must meet
62% of its final 2030 targets by the year 2022.166 On a broader scale, industry
experts predict that in just seven years, the United States could lose more than
one-third of its coal-fired power plant fleet, causing many regions to fall
below reserve margin standards necessary to ensure reliability.167 Also, if
meeting these interim emission rates will result in premature closure of coal-
fired power plants, many people will be left unemployed.
Provided that electricity generation is “planned decades in advance to
ensure reliability,”168 the interim targets that the states must meet impede the
flexibility the states need to carry out carbon emission reductions in a cost-
effective manner, and jeopardize the reliability of the electricity supply. The
EPA can ensure that substantial reductions occur within the 2030 timeframe
by eliminating the rigid interim targets and substituting them with flexible,
individually tailored glide paths to the 2030 targets. To mitigate compliance
concerns, the EPA could require state plans to include reporting requirements
demonstrating obedience to the state plan. Additionally, the EPA could
require states to implement contingency plans that would be designed to
remedy any divergence.
In sum, by replacing the rigid interim target requirements with a more
flexible glide path, the EPA achieves the following key objectives: First, the
Supreme Court is more likely to view these regulations as sensibly taking
into account cost effectiveness and thereby falling within the EPA’s
congressional authorization. Second, the regulations come with less
compliance costs and reliability risks. Third, the regulations provide state
regulators and energy providers with the needed flexibility to adapt to
constantly changing conditions and to exploit new technologies as they
become available. Finally, and most importantly, the regulations are still
capable of providing meaningful carbon emission reductions.
C. FLEXIBILITY IN THE 2030 TARGETDATE
A second adjustment the EPA should make to the regulations is to allow
the states to extend the compliance deadline beyond 2030 upon the showing
that a state plan will achieve a similar amount of reduction within a
reasonable timeframe. A key concern among industry leaders is that the
current strict deadline of 2030 does not allow “for the orderly retirement of
165. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,677; see also CPP FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 4.
166. AMEREN, AMEREN’S GENERATION STRATEGY VS. THE EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN: A
CASE STUDY IN THE BENEFITS OFMIDWESTERN PRAGMATISM 10 (2015). For a full list of interim
and final carbon emission reduction goals on a state-by-state basis see, Clean Power Plan–State
Specific Fact Sheet, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplantoolbox/clean-
power-plan-state-specific-fact-sheets (last updated Sept. 16, 2016).
167. See Levitan, supra note 153; see also RELIABILITY IMPACTS, supra note 151, at 17–20 (the
CPP is likely to lead to reduced grid reliability).
168. AMEREN, supra note 166, at 10.
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coal plants to coincide with the planned construction of lower emitting
sources and renewables.”169 As mentioned, this takes years of advance
planning. The strict 2030 deadline under the CPP effectively compromises
all that planning. Again, to ensure compliance under this proposal, state plans
would be required to have strict disclosure requirements.
D. RE-EVALUATERATE-BASEDMETHODOLOGY
On February 11, 2015, Ameren Energy Company released a study
analyzing the practical effects the CPP would have on its energy
generation.170 In the study, Ameren suggested a third amendment that the
EPA should make to significantly improve the CPP. As explained, one of the
formulas the EPA uses to gauge progress as utilities undertake the transition
to less-carbon intense generation sources is the lb/MWh ratio.171 Ameren
points out that, under this formula, only when a retired plant is replaced with
other fossil fuel generation is proper credit given.172 However, when a retired
plant is not replaced with fossil fuel generation, the improved emission
dynamic is not accounted for. The result is that coal-heavy states that are
forced to retire many plants in order to achieve compliance with emission
targets get very little credit for the emissions reductions they actually
achieved. Ameren concluded that:
properly recognizing this credit, utilities would be incentivized to retire
coal-fired generation not required for reliability purposes and avoid
installing unneeded new generation to comply with the EPA’s emission
reduction formula. The result would be more stable electricity prices, a
reduction in CO2 emissions, reduced risk of reliability problems and proper
credit for significantly lowering CO2 emissions. It would also provide states
additional needed flexibility in achieving their final CO2 target rate.173
Giving utility companies and states proper credit where credit is due will
help alleviate some of the burdens in meeting the interim and final target
dates. This additional flexibility will play a strong role in the CPP’s ability to
pass judicial scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
While we may live in an era “where human activities will largely
determine the evolution of earth’s climate,”174 heavy-handed and sweeping
regulations—such as those under the CPP—are not necessarily the solution.
169. Id.
170. See generally id.
171. The EPA’s formula for setting carbon emission reductions is “CO2 from fossil fuel-fired
power plants (in pounds) divided by electricity generation from fossil-fuel fired power plants and
certain low-or-zero emitting power sources in megawatt hours.” Id. at 3.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id.
174. CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS, supra note 14, at 3.
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As one commentator bluntly concluded, “President Obama’s climate plan
would have a chilling effect on the economy, not the climate.”175
Constructive and common sense amendments to the CPP are needed to help
the regulations pass judicial scrutiny, avoid the risk of imposing staggering
costs on utility customers, and prevent significant risks to electric grid
reliability.
This Note posits some pragmatic amendments to the EPA’s Plan that
include: removing the plan’s interim targets that begin in 2022; enhancing
states’ interim reporting requirements to ensure that progress is being made
to achieve the 2030 target; allowing for a reasonable extension of the 2030
deadline if utilities are making substantive progress toward achieving the
EPA’s final greenhouse gas goals; and allowing full credit for the retirement
of coal-fired power plants. These amendments will give states much needed
flexibility to ensure compliance with the target dates set out in the Plan.
Additionally, this added flexibility will mitigate the negative economic risks
currently associated with the Plan. More importantly, these amendments
ensure that the Supreme Court will not see these regulations as a federal
overreach beyond the EPA’s statutory authority.
EPILOGUE
Just prior to this Note’s publication, onMarch 28, 2017, President Trump
signed an Executive Order directing the EPA to dismantle the CPP (the
Order).176 Specifically, the Order directs the EPA Administrator to “as soon
as practicable, suspend, revise or rescind [the CPP].”177 Legal experts explain
that pursuant to the language of this Order, EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt is
now faced with two possible options moving forward.178 The first option is
to repeal the Plan and not replace it with anything at all.179 This can be
accomplished by the EPA pointing to the legal challenges that plague the
current regulations, such as the CAA’s prohibition against double regulation
of existing coal-fired power plants.180 In other words, the EPA can make the
175. Nicholas Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Climate
Regulations: A Primer, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 7, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2015/07/the-many-problems-of-the-epas-clean-power-plan-and-climate-regulations-a-
primer#_ftnref48.
176. See Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/presidential-executive-order-
promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Executive
Order]; see also Tatiana Schlossberg, What to Know About Trump’s Order to Dismantle the Clean
Power Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/science/what-to-
know-about-trumps-order-to-dismantle-the-clean-power-plan.html?_r=1.
177. See Executive Order, supra note 176, at Sec. 4.
178. See e.g., Brad Plumer, I asked Legal Experts How Trump Could Kill Obama’s Clean Power
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argument that under the HOR version of the CAA, the EPA is not required
to regulate GHGs from existing power plants, and in fact, it is illegal to do so
because this would subject these power plants to double regulation.181
Alternatively, the EPA could concede (or maintain its current position)
that it has authority to regulate emissions from existing power plants and
replace the current regulations with a more modest version.182 The EPA can
implement regulations with much more flexibility that allows GHG emission
reduction to occur without sparking negative repercussions such as higher
energy costs and grid reliability risks. Arguably, these new regulations can
look very similar to the regulations this Note advocates for.
Regardless of which route the EPA ultimately settles on, it must follow
a lengthy administrative proceeding to repeal the existing regulations and/or
to enact any new regulations.183 This process can take months and even years,
because it requires periods of public notice and comment.184 In addition, any
repeal or replacement plan is sure to spark massive resistance from advocates
and environmental groups, which will likely result in even further delays.185
It is still too early to determine how other countries around the world,
especially China and India, will react to the United States’ unsettled climate
policies. However, one major drawback with all this uncertainty is that
without a concrete plan of its own, the United States cannot hope to lead a
sustained international effort to control carbon emissions. In sum, while this
Order offers the EPA the opportunity to craft a more sensible regulatory
scheme, the fallout from a protracted legal battle may eviscerate any serious




183. See Schlossberg, supra note 176.
184. Id. The Clean Power Plan, for example, took well over a year fromwhen it was first proposed
in June 2014 to when it was finalized in August 2016.
185. See Plumer, supra note 178.
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